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A bank, acting as a central planner under aggregate full certainty, optimizes liquidity allocation by sharing risk between 
discrete number of depositors. This paper demonstrates the following. (a) It is sufficient to rule out a bank run if all 
depositors inform the bank their types, patient or impatient, in advance, in a noncommittal manner. There cannot be a 
bank run because depositors’ strategic behaviour induces the bank to act as a central planner under aggregate full 
certainty. (b) The impossibility of a bank run is consistent with the price mechanism in partial equilibrium; but it may 
be inconsistent with the price mechanism in general disequilibrium. (c) The paper concludes that the management of 
risk sharing by banks is not a cause for bank runs. 
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Introduction 
 
The issue of bank runs is addressed in the literature from 
two polar points of view. The one view is Diamond and 
Dybvig’s (1983, henceforth DD); according to which there 
is a continuum of depositors and the bank acts as their 
central planer. Depositors act in an uncertain environment. 
Uncertainty is due to private information that is unknown 
presently and reaches each depositor only in the future. The 
law of large numbers ensures that the bank can act under 
aggregate full certainty. The other view, due to Green and 
Lin, (2000, henceforth GL), is similar to DD with the 
proviso that there is a discrete number of depositors. 
Because the number of depositors is discrete, aggregate 
uncertainty may not be removed by a bank that acts as a 
central planner. 
 
It is known that according to the first view there exist two 
equilibria: a ‘good’ equilibrium where aggregate risk 
sharing benefits each depositor, and a ‘bad’ equilibrium 
where a run on the bank takes place. Note that despite its 
existence, a ‘good’ equilibrium may be inadmissible. It is 
also known that in the other view no run on the bank is 
possible. The impossibility of bank run is achieved under 
the somewhat unrealistic condition that each depositor 
approaching the bank for the possibility of withdrawing his 
deposit knows his place in the queue of all depositors 
approaching the bank for the same purpose.  
 
This paper concentrates on the view that the number of 
depositors is discrete while the latter condition that each 
depositor knows his place in the queue is relaxed. Instead, 
the realistic assumption that each depositor knows his 
preference for a type, whether patient or impatient, is 
maintained at the time he makes his deposit in the bank. 
Each depositor, however, is aware that he might change his 
preferred type depending on other depositors’ revealed 
behaviour in the future concerning the withdrawal of their 
deposits. Hence, although each depositor knows his type 
initially, he is uncertain whether he will keep his type 
unchanged in the future. At the time each depositor makes 
his deposit in the bank he informs the bank his type in a 
noncommittal manner (i.e., in ‘cheap talk’, e.g., Farrell & 
Rabin (1996)). Being aware that the message of each 
depositor concerning his type is noncommittal, the bank, in 
turn, draws a contract with each depositor stating that the 
depositor is allowed to withdraw his deposit either in the 
near future or in the remote future. Obviously, the return to a 
deposit depends on its duration.  
 
It will be demonstrated in this paper that the above scenario 
ensures that no depositor, in a group of discrete number of 
depositors, will change in the future his presently preferred 
type. That is, despite the noncommittal message of each 
depositor to the bank, lying for strategic advantage is not 
beneficial to any depositor. Since this is known to everyone, 
the bank, as a central planner, acts from the beginning under 
aggregate full certainty. Thus, a similar ‘good’ equilibrium 
as in DD is achieved while the number of depositors is 
discrete. Unlike, however, the possibility of a ‘bad’ 
equilibrium beside the ‘good’ equilibrium in DD, here the 
possibility of a ‘bad’ equilibrium of bank run is ruled out.  
 
Furthermore, this paper demonstrates that banks in a partial 
equilibrium framework facilitate the existence of efficient 
prices. Hence, the operation of the price mechanism is 
consistent with the existence of a ‘good’ equilibrium and is 
inconsistent with the existence of a ‘bad’ equilibrium. That 
is, the partial equilibrium framework cannot explain 
episodes of bank runs. The inclusion of price uncertainty in 
partial equilibrium still leaves episodes of bank runs 
unexplained. Since a bank run is a reality and since a partial 
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equilibrium framework cannot explain episodes of bank 
runs, this paper argues that bank runs should be analysed by 
the price mechanism in a framework of general 
disequilibrium.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, the 
framework for discussion is presented. Then, a distinction 
between two polar cases is drawn, banks with a continuum 
of depositors and banks with a discrete number of 
depositors. The paper presents a scenario under which the 
bank’s operation with a discrete number of depositors 
maintains a ‘good’ equilibrium similar to that in DD. The 
paper concludes by showing that the impossibility of a bank 
run is consistent with the price mechanism in partial 
equilibrium analysis and may be inconsistent with general 
disequilibrium analysis. Thus, the mechanism of adjusting  
disequilibrium prices may be a trigger for bank runs. It is 
also argued that introducing price uncertainty does not affect 
the above conclusion that bank runs are impossible in a 
partial equilibrium setting. The paper suggests that the 
management of risk sharing by banks is not a cause for bank 
runs. 
 
Basic framework for discussion 
 
Consider a bank as an organization set voluntarily by a 
group of depositors. The bank operates in a competitive 
environment according to certain binding rules. The 
objective of the bank is to maximize depositors’ welfare. 
The time profile is open ended with a replica of two periods: 
near-future, t 1  and remote-future, t 2 . Every period is 
an interval of time [0,T] , T 0 , where 0 and T are, 
respectively, the beginning and end of each period. 
 
t 2
t 1
0 0 T
T


                          

  
 
Each depositor enters the economy with an endowment of 1 
unit of a single good which is immediately deposited in a 
bank. The single good acts in period 1 as a unit of account. 
Depositors have no endowments in the second period.  
 
The bank can invest the depositors’ endowments in two 
schemes with the following returns. Scheme 1: the 
endowment of 1 unit is kept in the bank till the end of the 
first period, it returns r 1 units, in this case the asset is 
liquid. Scheme 2: the endowment of 1 unit is kept in the 
bank till the end of period 2, it returns R 1  units, in this 
case the asset is illiquid. Furthermore, an illiquid asset may 
be terminated prematurely at the end of the first period with 
a return of 1 unit. Hence, the return of an illiquid asset 
dominates the return of a liquid asset. Consequently, 
initially, at the beginning of period 1, the bank will consider 
all deposits as long term deposits liquidated at the end of 
period 2 and if need be some deposits will be liquidated at 
the end of the first period. 
 
In DD and GL depositors find out their types, whether 
patient or impatient, at the end of period 1 after receiving a 
private signal. This seems an unrealistic observation. 
Instead, in this paper it is maintained that at the beginning of 
period 1 each depositor tells the bank in a noncommittal 
manner his preferred type. The depositor is impatient if he 
withdraws his deposit from the bank at the end of period 1, 
and he is patient if he withdraws his deposit from the bank 
at the end of period 2. Despite this, at the beginning of 
period 1 when the bank receives the deposits, it draws a 
contract with each depositor according to which the 
depositor is allowed to withdraw his deposit either at the end 
of period 1 or at the end of period 2 irrespective of the 
depositor’s declared preferred type. Thus, the bank and each 
depositor consider each declared depositor’s preferred type 
as a ‘cheap talk’, i.e., not binding to each party of the 
contract. Each depositor can change his mind concerning the 
duration of his deposit if he deems such an act favourable to 
him while taking into consideration other depositors’ acts. 
The freedom of each depositor to withdraw his deposit at the 
end of the first period or at the end of the second period 
renders depositors’ types potentially uncertain. (It will be 
shown later that ‘potential uncertainty’ is ineffective in this 
setting.) The return on each deposit depends on its duration 
as is stated above.  
 
The only source of potential uncertainty is each depositor’s 
type. This uncertainty prevails only in period 1, because at 
the end of period 1 each depositor’s type becomes fully 
known: the impatient depositors withdraw their deposits and 
the rest are patient depositors. Each depositor enters the 
economy with a utility function 1 2u(c ,c )  where 1c  and 2c  
are consumptions in period 1 and in period 2 respectively. 
This function1 maintains the expected utility form 
1 2u(c ) (1 )u(c )   where  and 1  are the respective 
probabilities that a depositor is impatient or patient. After 
the resolution of uncertainty the impatient depositor’s utility 
is 1u(c ) ,  he values only near-future consumption; and the 
patient depositor’s utility is 2u(c ) , he values only remote- 
future consumption.  
 
Continuum of depositors 
 
A bank as a central planner need not know who is a patient 
and who is an impatient depositor. It only needs to know the 
proportion of patient versus impatient depositors. 
Accordingly, DD assume a continuum of depositors where a 
proportion   of depositors are impatient and 1  are 
patient. Because of the law of large numbers, the 
proportions   and 1  are also the respective 
probabilities of impatient and patient depositors. In light of 
this, and irrespective of any strategic reasoning, the bank 
acts from the beginning of period 1 under conditions of 
aggregate full certainty despite the uncertainty that each 
depositor faces prior to the end of period 1. This enables the 
bank to draw a contract with each depositor according to 
which the bank allows each depositor to withdraw his 
deposit either at the end of period 1 (with a return r 1 ) or 
at the end of period 2 (with a return R 1 ). Note that 
because of the continuum of depositors, the only 
information that is relevant to the bank’s operation is the 
                                           
1The utility function 1 2u(c ,c ) is concave, monotonically increasing in 
1 2c ,c  and satisfies u (0)   , u ( ) 0   . It is also assumed that the 
relative risk aversion coefficient cu (c) u (c) 1    everywhere. 
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probabilities   and 1  of impatient and patient 
depositors which the bank knows in advance before the 
depositors approach the bank. The message that each 
depositor conveys to the bank regarding his type has no 
bearing on the bank’s operation. 
 
The objective of the bank is to maximize 
1 2u(c ) (1 )u(c )   subject to the two constraints, (1) 
1c L   and  (2) 2(1 )c R(1 )   ,  where L is the 
fraction of the asset liquidated at the end of period 1. This 
maximization method is a central planning of returns under 
aggregate full certainty where the bank pools all deposits in 
order to maximize total welfare of society (see Tirole 
2006:454-456)). This maximization method has potentially 
two equilibria, (a) and (b) below, 
 
(a) either, there exist 1c  and 2c  such that, 
 
1 2u (c ) u (c ) R
     
 
in which case, 1 21 c c R
     
 
(b) or, there exists 1c
  for which, 
 
1
1
c for  ( 1)c
0    for          1  
      
 
 
where   is a posterior probability of impatient depositors. 
Part (a) is labelled a ‘good’ equilibrium where the marginal 
condition of utility maximization is satisfied. Furthermore, 
this equilibrium maintains 1 21 c c R
     because the 
relative risk aversion coefficient (footnote 1) is greater than 
1. Beside (a), a different equilibrium exists, as is stated in 
part (b). This is labelled a ‘bad’ equilibrium. A proportion 
of depositors 0  run on the bank and if this 
proportion is big enough the bank will run out of liquidity. 
 
Parts (a) and (b) are two conflicting equilibria that result 
from the same maximization problem of central planning 
(see Abraham, 2008). At any time before the end of period 
1, both parts seem possible and only in a hind sight (ex post) 
one of them will exist. Nevertheless, the observation that the 
two equilibria seem possible suggests that, ex post, the 
resulting equilibrium depends on the psychology of 
depositors. This observation contradicts the mathematically 
objective rule of the minimax criterion that a depositor, who 
is driven only by logic, utilizes. But if the minimax principle 
is overridden by an alternative criterion, then the 
methodology of the alternative criterion must bring some 
information into the analysis (see Raiffa, 1968:289-295). 
This is impossible in DD. The bank, acting as a central 
planner, relies solely on the formal rule of large numbers to 
conduct its operation.  
 
In light of the above, one can conclude that neither the bank 
nor any depositors regard any messages (through ‘cheap 
talk’) as credible. Therefore no depositor regards such 
messages as self-committing. This leaves the minimax 
principle as the only criterion for decision making. That is, 
paradoxically, from the beginning of period 1 it is common 
knowledge that the ‘good’ equilibrium that relies on the 
psychology of depositors is ruled out.  
 
Discrete number of depositors 
 
Based on the above it is apparent that the design of an 
environment of aggregate full certainty under central 
planning should be a consequence of strategic behaviour of 
depositors; otherwise, a paradoxical outcome will emerge as 
in the DD’s design. Accordingly, the GL’s design of a bank 
as a club-like arrangement with a discrete number of 
depositors is utilized here. In the GL’s design, when 
depositors queue to withdraw their deposits from the bank, it 
is assumed that each one knows his place in the queue. 
Unlike the DD’s design, a bank in GL operates under 
conditions of aggregate uncertainty because the law of large 
numbers no longer holds when the number of depositors is 
discrete. 
 
In this paper the interaction of the bank with its depositors 
ensures that it operates under conditions of aggregate full 
certainty. This is achieved by removing the assumption that 
depositors receive private signals one period after depositing 
their 1 unit endowment in the bank. Instead, a more realistic 
assumption is maintained here; namely, depositors engage in 
a ‘cheap talk’ with the bank, according to which, at the 
beginning of period 1, each depositor informs the bank his 
preferred type in a noncommittal manner. The bank takes 
this information as credible (it will be argued in the sequel 
that in a hind sight the bank’s treatment of this information 
as credible is correct) and acts upon it. Susequently, the 
bank conducts a similar constrained maximization under 
aggregate full certainty as in DD, while case (b) of ‘bad’ 
equilibrium is ruled out. 
 
Discussion 
 
At the beginning of period 1 each depositor informs the 
bank his preferred type. It will now be argued that this 
information can never be untruthful when the number of 
depositors is discrete. To see this, consider a queue of 
depositors at the end of period 1. It is obvious that impatient 
depositors who enjoy consumption only in period 1 will first 
join the queue and will never lie about their type. That is, 
they genuinely join the queue to withdraw their deposits. A 
patient depositor, however, who has already revealed his 
type in a noncommittal manner, will first observe the length 
of the queue before deciding whether to change his mind 
and join the queue. Thus, a patient queuing depositor is 
always aware that all depositors behind him are patient. 
Therefore, a patient depositor will never stay in a queue. If 
he is the last queuing depositor, he will immediately leave 
the queue; because if he were to stay in the queue and 
discover (as he should) that he is last, he will realise that he 
is better off leaving the queue. If he stays in the queue he 
will have to accept whatever liquidity is left in the bank, but 
if he waits until the end of period 2 he is assured to get this 
quantity of liquidity and probably more. Since this applies to 
every patient depositor who is last in the queue, and since no 
impatient depositors queue between two patient depositors, 
by induction, no patient depositor will stay in a queue at the 
end of period 1. This implies that the ‘cheap talk’ messages 
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communicated to the bank at the beginning of period 1 must 
be self-committing, and lying for strategic advantage is 
impossible. Being aware of this, the bank takes the 
depositors’ messages at the beginning of period 1 as credible 
and acts as a central planner under aggregate full certainty.  
 
The bank acts as a central planner with similar constrained 
maximization objective in both cases, under a continuum of 
depositors and under a discrete number of depositors. In the 
case of a continuum of depositors a bank run is imminent 
and the banking system is chronically under a threat of 
collapse. This is because everyone regards other depositors’ 
messages as incredible and therefore does not consider them 
of any strategic value. In the case of a discrete number of 
depositors, messages are credible and therefore are taken 
fully into strategic consideration. The full certainty 
depositors enjoy is a direct consequence of their joining the 
bank. That is, here, unlike DD and GL, the resolution of 
uncertainty is not at the end of period 1 but rather at the 
beginning of period 1 when each depositor joins the bank. 
The returns to depositors are similar to those of DD in the 
case of a ‘good’ equilibrium where the bank maximizes 
welfare of the society of all depositors. 
 
The above discussion leaves open the question of what 
causes bank runs when the bank, as a central planner, 
manages the risk sharing of all depositors. It might be 
claimed that the uncertainty of deposit returns has been 
overlooked in the above discussion; and that when this is 
taken into account bank runs may be explained by the 
uncertainty in future asset prices. Such a claim is invalid 
because of the following reason. Under such a scenario the 
most a bank can do is to ensure that asset markets are 
complete; and a bank run, if it happens, would take the same 
form as the ‘bad’ equilibrium in DD with the fundamental 
difference that the posterior probability of a bank run would 
be correlated with patient depositor’s views of future asset 
prices. Accordingly, when each depositor informs the bank 
his type initially in a noncommittal manner, it still 
guaranties truth telling of all depositors as in the above 
scenario of no asset price uncertainty.    
 
It may now be concluded that the management of risk 
sharing by banks is not a cause for bank runs when the 
management is done in accordance with the strategic 
behaviour of depositors. The question of what triggers bank 
run is then left unanswered as is mentioned above. It will be 
argued in the sequel that the price mechanism in partial 
equilibrium is consistent with no run on the bank. Therefore 
bank runs may not be explained in a partial equilibrium 
analysis as in DD and GL. It will also be argued that when 
the operations of banks are explained within a general 
disequilibrium analysis, the price mechanism of adjusting 
prices according to market forces of excess demands may be 
a cause that triggers runs on banks.  
 
The price mechanism as a cause for bank runs 
 
It has long been observed (Allais, 1987) that the investment 
technology of the bank, as is described above by the returns 
of schemes 1 and 2, leads to a peculiar balance  sheet 
structure of the bank’s assets, where promises to pay back 
its depositors fall short of its liabilities which are the 
individuals’ deposits that may be withdrawn on demand. 
This peculiar structure of the bank’s balance sheet is the 
cause for financial fragility (see Abraham, 2009). In this 
section the asset price mechanism in partial equilibrium and 
in general disequilibrium will be outlined with a reference to 
bank runs.  It will be explained why the peculiarity of the 
bank’s balance sheet structure is not a cause for bank runs in 
partial equilibrium, while it may be a cause for bank runs in 
general disequilibrium. 
 
Partial equilibrium 
 
Consider a competitive setting in partial equilibrium with 
the same time profile as above and without banks. At the 
beginning of period 1 all individuals are uncertain of their 
type. Therefore each individual would hold a certain amount 
of his wealth (i.e., endowment) in a liquid asset and the rest 
in an illiquid asset. At the end of period 1 each individual 
discovers his type. He then reveals his type, patient or 
impatient, to the other traders in the market. This setting 
(due to Allen & Gale, 1994) is similar to DD with the 
absence of a bank as a central planner. At the end of period 
1 there is an auctioneer who declares prices to settle the 
asset market in equilibrium. The price clearing kernel in 
partial equilibrium is P min{R, M L} , M L R , where 
M is the total amount of the liquid asset held by the patient 
individuals and L is the total amount of the illiquid asset 
held by the impatient individuals. In the price clearing 
kernel, P M L  is the cash-in-the-market price (i.e., 
liquidity constrained price) and P R  is the standard 
efficient market price. In this partial equilibrium framework 
the price P declared by the auctioneer is an equilibrium 
price.   
 
In the above partial equilibrium framework, the cash-in-the-
market equilibrium price can be brought closer to the market 
efficient price by introducing a bank acting as a central 
planner and a provider of liquidity. The provision of 
liquidity by the bank against IOU is a safe operation because 
the IOU will always be honoured. This observation renders 
the treatment of bank runs in partial equilibrium 
problematic. This stands in contradiction to reality where 
bank runs do occur and sometimes they are even frequent. In 
the sequel an explanation for bank runs is suggested despite 
the truth telling strategy of depositors. This is based on the 
price adjustment mechanism in general disequilibrium. 
 
General disequilibrium 
 
Now consider a general disequilibrium setting where each 
individual holds more than one good including fiat money. 
At disequilibrium prices not all markets clear, therefore 
prices change according to market forces of excess 
demands. Thus, if there is positive (negative) market excess 
demand for a certain good its price rises (falls). In addition, 
(a) individuals trade with each other in the direction of their 
excess demands and (b) trade between individuals is 
conducted such that each individual’s value (at current 
prices) of purchases equals the value of sells. Trade that 
maintains (a) and (b) complies with price taking behaviour 
in a competitive environment. It is known (Arrow & Hahn, 
1971:340) that when prices change according to market 
excess demands and trade takes place at prevailing prices 
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according to (a) and (b), in general, some individuals run out 
of cash (liquidity), the price adjustment mechanism will 
reach an impasse and general equilibrium prices will fail to 
exist.  
 
Unlike the partial equilibrium framework, the introduction 
of banks in general disequilibrium admits episodes of bank 
runs. Because of the above impasse, in general 
disequilibrium the bank does not know whether the IOU 
received against the provision of liquidity will be honoured. 
While the bank provides liquidity at general disequilibrium, 
prices change and therefore the individuals who owe the 
bank IOU might not have sufficient liquidity to honour their 
obligations. When such a situation arrives patient depositors 
might reverse their initial strategy and become impatient. 
This can cause a run on the bank and bankruptcy. Such a 
possibility, however, is not reflected in the partial 
equilibrium framework.   
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